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The Court of Appeal’s approach to third-party insurance claims

Incidents where security staff at bars and other venues go over the top when excluding customers are regrettable but not uncommon. The issues that arise would be expected to be relatively straightforward without any legal complexity or difficulty.  However the Court of Appeal has twice this year had to consider legal issues of some complexity, which in each case resulted in a victim of a serious assault receiving no compensation.

In Burger v Wetherspoons, the issue was whether the door staff involved were employed by Wetherspoons or an independent contractor. The Court of Appeal held that as they were employed by an independent contractor, Wetherspoons had no liability. In an earlier article, I suggested that a different approach might have resulted in a more satisfactory outcome.

Now in Makin v Protec Security, another victim of security staff has failed to recover compensation. Whilst the Claimant established liability, he was not able to enforce his judgment against their insurers.

Third Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010

Mr Makin’s claim against the insurers was brought under the Third Party (Rights against Insurance) Act 2010. This act enables a Claimant with a judgment against an insolvent Defendant to enforce it against its insurers. However, this right is significantly qualified. As Lord Justice Harman put it in the case of Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd decided under the predecessor 1930 Act,

“Therefore, I would decide this case on the narrow ground that the rights assigned to the Post Office by the statute must be coupled with the rest of the particular rights and obligations which make up the contract of insurance, one cannot pick up one bit – pick out the plums and leave the duff behind”.

The third party therefore can be in no better position than the insured themselves in terms of seeking compensation under the Act.

The importance of insurance notification clauses

In Makin, the insurers QBE were able to rely upon a breach of a notification clause in the relevant insurance contract.This required Protec to notify QBE of any incident which may give rise to liability as soon as practicable and in any event within 30 days.This they did not do.

The judge at first instance held that the fact that the doormen were notified that they were going to be interviewed by the police in relation to the incident was sufficient to require notification as something which may give rise to liability. The judge also ruled that the notification clause was a condition precedent that is critical to QBE’s liability under the insurance contract. In these circumstances, QBE did not have to demonstrate that they had been prejudiced by any delay in notification. The Court of Appeal held that the judge’s interpretation of the insurance contract had been correct.

The decision of the Court of Appeal reflects established, albeit arcane, insurance law. Taking insurance law as a given, nonetheless the outcome does raise a difficult issue as to the operation of the 2010 Act.

When does an insurer’s notification obligation arise?

The 2010 Act followed review by the Law Commission of the predecessor 1930 Act. In 1998, the Law Commission published a consultation paper. In relation to notification clauses, the consultation paper made two suggestions. First, that the third party should have independent rights to notify the insurer and secondly, that insurers could only rely on breach of notification clauses,

“… to the extent that such breach are causative of the loss and have created prejudice to the insurer …”

This latter suggestion did not make it to the final report, and therefore to the legislation. The view of the Law Commission after consultation was that the problem with notification clauses could be sufficiently mitigated by giving the third party an independent right to notification. This was duly enacted in section 9(2) of the 2010 Act.

“Anything done by the third party which, if done by the insured, would have amounted to or contributed to fulfilment of the condition, is to be treated as if done by the insured”.

The implications for injured claimants

In theory Mr Makin could have avoided this outcome by giving notification to QBE in accordance with the clause in the contract.  In practical terms this was never going to happen. Mr Makin suffered a stroke two days after the incident, which the judge on a trial of liability found was the result of the index assault. Mr Makin was hospitalised and suffered cerebral damage. Even in the absence of such significant injury, it is very unlikely that within a period of 30 days, Mr Makin could have been in a position to notify QBE of the claim. Reflecting the combined outcome of the Burger and the instant case, Mr Makin would first have had to have established that the doormen were employed by an independent contractor. Then still within the 30-day period, he would have to have acquainted himself with the notification requirements in the contractor’s insurance contract.

In this context, it is relevant to observe that there is probably a significant difference between the position of a third party in a personal injury action to that in a dispute between large commercial organisations where the 1930 Act comes into play. Such organisations are likely to have understanding of the requirements of the opponent organisation’s insurance arrangements, at least in terms of likely obligations. However, an injured Claimant such as Mr Makin would not begin to anticipate that he was prejudiced within the 30-day period by inaction.

Should insurers have to demonstrate prejudice?

Requiring an insurer in a personal injury claim to show prejudice if there was breach of a notification clause would strike a reasonable balance between the third party and the insurer. The third party only in most cases has a connection with the insured because the insured has injured the third party. Whereas the insurer has entered into a contract and received a premium from the insured. That an insurer can escape liability by their choice of policy wording in the absence of prejudice weighs the balance too strongly in the insurer’s favour.

It would therefore be reasonable to argue that the operation of the Acts, at least in relation to personal injury claims, reflected the Law Commission’s original suggestion in 1998. However, if this was to be considered, it is difficult to see it would happen anytime soon. The first consultation paper was in 1998. It took a further 12 years for the statute to be enacted.

 

Author

Charles Feeny is a senior barrister with extensive experience in personal injury and clinical negligence law. Called to the Bar in 1977, he has developed a particular interest in access to justice, legal reform and the practical implications of developments in the law. Through his thought leadership and commentary, Charles offers independent perspectives on significant legal decisions and the wider issues affecting claimants, practitioners and the justice system.

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